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1. Introduction. 
Denis Galligan in his book about discretionary powers, addressing the topic of the 
intensity of review of discretionary powers by the courts of common law, observes that "the 
historical development of judicial review is a fine example of incrementalism, of the 
piecemeal evolution of a body of doctrine in response to changing political and social 
factors". Then, in summing up the common law experience, he notes that "The Courts in 
practice shift between the different levels in accordance with the kinds of factors that are by 
now familiar: the constitutional doctrines, the nature of the instititution and its powers, the 
interest at issue. It seems also that judicial review is bound to fluctuate in this way for those 
kinds of reasons, and that few benefits are to be gained from uniform, rigid approach
"1
.  
 
In my presentation, I will try to discuss two main points: 
a. whether the fluctuations that, similarly, Italian jurisprudence shows express any 
clear rationale, or, on the contrary, are just signs of theoretical and practical confusion; 
b. whether a significant incrementation of the intensity of judicial scrutiny is 
predictable. In this respect, I will especially examine the development in course in the context 
of European Union jurisprudence, which is trying to make the intensity of its judicial review 
on antitrust fines in line with the doctrine of full jurisdiction, as elaborated by the European 
Court of Human rights. 
 
2. General Principles Governing Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Italy. 
 
Following the French model, the Italian system of judicial review of administrative 
action is almost entirely established around a separate judiciary, whose highest court is the 
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Council of State. As in France, one of the main historical reasons of this organizational 
choice is to be found in the principle of separation of powers: the administrative judiciary, 
when established in 1889, was considered as a part of the executive. Therefore the power to 
quash administrative acts assigned to the Council was perceived as perfectly in line with the 
separation between executive and judiciary. At the very beginning, it was even controversial 
whether the Council of State was due to exercise a real judicial power, or, on the contrary, 
just a particular administrative power of internal annulment of administrative action, in the 
general interest of legality (i.e., an interest that belongs at first to the State)
2
. 
Coming to the present days, the Italian Constitution, enacted in 1947, does not 
expressly codify the principle of separation of powers, and in any case, allows the legislator 
to vest ordinary courts with the power of quashing administrative acts (art. 113, last par.
3
). As 
a result, now, ordinary courts have, for example, jurisdiction on a great part of administrative 
fines. No doubts, however, that the vast majority of the administrative acts are still to be 
challenged before Administrative Courts (which represent, according the Constitutional Court, 
"the natural judge of the lawfulness of the exercise of the public function"
4
). 
Under art. 113, pars. 1 and 2
5
, judicial review is constitutionally guaranteed only in 
terms of review of legality-lawfulness: all and any kind of violations of laws (either 
substantive ore procedural) as well as of general principles of administrative action can, in 
principle, trigger the annulment of any type of administrative act by the competent court. 
More in details, unlawfulness is a quite inclusive concept, for it covers any kind of 
unreasonableness and lack of proportionality, as well as the failure from properly examining 
the facts in the administrative phase and to pursuit the specific public law interest for which 
the power has been conferred (so called eccesso di potere, excess of power). In other terms, 
under the scrutiny of eccesso di potere a substantial (as opposed to an only formalistic and 
external) judicial review is made available. A law aiming at restricting the general right to 
challenge any administrative act for any reason of illegality-unlawfulness would be 
unconstitutional. However, no constitutional protection exists as to the possibility of 
challenging the so called "administrative merits" (i.e., the merits of the administrative 
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decision). The Constitution allows (but does not impose) the legislator to vest Courts with the 
power to substitute their own decision for the one taken by the Administration. Consistently, 
art. 100, par. 1, of Constitution defines the Council of State as an organ aimed at ensuring the 
justice within the Administration ("Il Consiglio di Stato è organo….di tutela della giustizia 
nell'amministrazione"), and this seems to suggest that no rigid distinction exist between 
administrative function and judicial function of the administrative courts. In other terms, the 
distribution of competence between the Courts and the Administration is a matter primarily 
left to the discretion of the ordinary legislator, without particular constitutional restraints . 
More in details, the current Italian administrative justice system is based on the 
distinction between two main areas of competence:  
- the so called jurisdiction of lawfulness (giurisdizione di legittimità) of the 
Administrative Courts and, 
- the so called jurisdiction on the merits (giurisdizione di merito) of the 
Administrative Courts.  
The former is a general competence (in the sense that it may be exercised in relation 
to any type of administrative decision, consistently with art. 113, par. 2, Constitution). The 
latter may be exercised only in the specific matters for which it is expressly provided for by 
the legislator (currently, art. 134 of Administrative Trial Code.). This distinction is of central 
importance for the purpose of this presentation: in fact, as suggested by its name, in the 
giurisdizione di merito the Administrative Court is vested with the power to directly address 
the very merits of the administrative decision, even where fully discretionary, and, thus, to 
replace it with its own decision (see in particular art. 7, par. 6, of Administrative Trial Code: 
"the Administrative judge exercises a jurisdiction with cognizance extended to the merits in 
the cases indicated by the law or by art. 134…in exercising such jurisdiction…it can 
substitute for the administration"). On the contrary, the administrative merits represent a 
barrier to the judicial review exercised in the context of the general giurisdizione di 
legittimità. 
To really understand the boundaries of the administrative merits (and therefore of the 
giurisdizione di legittimità) we need now to examine two essential concepts, i.e. the concepts 
of administrative discretion and that of technical discretion. 
According to the prevailing opinion , the administrative discretion may be defined as a 
power of choice conferred by the legislator to the Public Administration on how better 
pursuing the public interest in deciding on those features and contents of an administrative act, 
  4 
which are not already pre-determined by the law
6
. This decision is to be taken based on all 
the interests, whether public or private, which are involved in the administrative action. In 
particular, these interest are to be compared among one to another and with the primary 
interest (i.e., the public interest for the protection of which the administrative power is mainly 
conferred by law), so to eventually identify the so called concrete public interest, which is 
due to guide the final determination on which decision is to be taken. 
This definition makes it possible (at least in principle) a clear distinction between 
administrative discretion and the so called technical discretion. The latter, as the former, 
relates to complex choices, but, unlike administrative discretion, regards choices which do 
not involve public interest assessments, but just technical assessments, to be conducted based 
on a specific technical and scientific knowledge. An example: whether an academic can be 
qualified to be a full university professor is not a choice due to be based on a public interests 
assessments, but only on an assessment of his scientific preparation. It is an highly 
controversial assessment (whose outcome is far from being easily predictable in advance), 
and this explains the use of the term discretion, but it is logically different from a power of 
administrative discretion. 
Anyway, traditionally both the administrative and technical discretions have been 
considered as falling, in their hardcore, within the realm of administrative merits, and, as 
consequence, to be subject only to a scrutiny in terms of excess of powers, without any 
capacity for the administrative courts (except where vested with a competence on merits) to 
directly examine the intrinsic appropriateness and shareability of the choice. The scholars 
who have supported the assimilation between administrative and technical discretions have 
noted that wherever a choice is, in its hardcore, controversial, would be inappropriate for the 
Courts to replace the administrative choice with their one for two main reasons: a. the 
Administration is subject to the democratic principle, as accountable to democratically 
elected organs, whilst, by contrast, the Courts are, by definition, independent from any 
democratic control and guidelines
7
, since subject exclusively to the law (art. 101, par. 2, 
Constitution
8
); b. the public administration, pursuant to art. 97 Constitution (which codifies 
the principle of administrative efficiency and effectiveness), is due to be (and usually is) 
technically specialized, whilst Courts are inevitably much less prepared in (and reluctant to) 
dealing with complex technical choices that, as a consequence, eventually, would be left to 
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technical experts appointed by the Court
9
. But such experts do not offer any better guarantee 
of efficacy than a specialized administration.  
In any case, at present probably the majority of the scholars deems that technical 
discretion should be fully and intrinsically (re)examined by the Court
10
, although, according 
to a significant number of them, only up to a limit beyond which it is absolutely impossibly to 
identify a better solution, i.e. up to the limit of a clear and unavoidably controversiality of the 
assessment. 
As we will see more analytically in the next paragraph, the prevailing jurisprudence 
tends to show a quite deferential approach vis-à-vis technical discretion, and in particular, 
vis-à-vis administrative discretion. Apart from the cases of giurisdizione di merito, it is well 
established the principle according to which the administrative merits cannot be fully 
reviewed, i.e, that the administrative discretion cannot be examined, other than externally, in 
terms of eccesso di potere. As to the technical discretion, there is a high degree of confusion, 
although it is still well represented the idea that also in this kind of administrative powers 
only an external review is allowed. 
The position of the European Court of Human Rights is different. For example, in 
2005, it made it clear that wherever an administrative act is based on a complex technical 
assessment (such as the financial conditions of a bank), this does not exempt the national 
administrative court from exercising a full jurisdiction: either the administrative judges 
should appoint a technical expert, or a specialized court should be set up
11
. Indeed, in the 
view of Strasbourg judges, there is "a violation of the right to access to a court where the 
applicant could not challenge before a court an assessment of facts in a decision adopted by 
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an administrative authority acting within its discretionary power […]. It that case, the 
judicial review never led to a full scrutiny of the factual basis of such a decision"
12
.  
As a general principle, national Courts of full jurisdiction are not allowed " to have a 
determination of questions of both fact and law […] be displaced by the ipse dixit of the 
executive"
 13
. 
Recently, in the Placì judgment of 2014, the European Court took a specific position 
about the Italian model of judicial review of technical discretion. In a dispute related to the 
request of ascertaining that a mental illness had been caused by the compulsory service in the 
army (i.e., a complex technical assessment based on the medical sciences), the Court found 
Italy in breach of art. 6 ECHR. The Council of State, in fact - expressly on the ground of its 
limited powers of review in the jurisdiction of lawfulness - fully relied on the findings of an 
(directly interested) administrative body, without independently examining the central point 
at stake in the case, i.e. the alleged causal link between the military service and the illness. 
This (highly deferential) approach was expressly criticized: "the Court observes that the 
importance of the report in the applicant’s case is highlighted by the fact that on appeal the 
CS considered that it was indeed necessary for the determination of the case [...]. There is 
also no doubt as to the reliance of the CS on the Medical Board’s report, the findings of 
which it endorsed without hesitation or further assessment. Indeed, while adopting the 
report’s conclusions, the CS noted that in its limited powers of judicial review of 
administrative acts (sede di legittimità) it could not examine the merits of that report (despite 
a contrasting report having been produced by the applicant’s expert), irrespective of the fact 
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that the report had only been submitted at the appeal stage. The CS thus rejected the 
challenge raised by the applicant to the report based on the findings of his own expert […]. It 
follows that the relevant aspects of the judgment adopted were entirely based on the Medical 
Board’s findings"14. 
More in details, the intensity of review showed by the Council of State in the Placì 
case (and in many other similar judgments) is, at the same time, not in line with: 
a. the doctrine of full jurisdiction (that, in order to ex post cure the deficits of the 
administrative procedure at the result of which a criminal sanction has been inflicted or a 
civil rights has been determined, imposes a model of administrative justice in which the 
Court considers the submissions of the appellant "on their merits, point by point, without ever 
having to decline jurisdiction when replying to them or ascertaining various facts"
15
)  
b. the principle of equality of arms (that requires that each party is given a reasonable 
opportunity to present his case under conditions that do not place him at a substantial 
disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent): in other terms, wherever the Administration enjoys in a 
certain dispute a privileged position, in the sense that its ascertainment of fact is fully or 
partially undisputable and binding for the judge, not only full jurisdiction is not afforded, but, 
most of all, the private party, the appellant, is in a much weaker position than the 
Administration.  
In sum, wherever complex technical assessment of the Administration are, fully or 
partially binding for the Court, art. 6 results to be infringed from two standpoints:  
a. because lacking a full jurisdiction, no ex post compensation of the deficits of the 
administrative procedure is possible;  
b. because even in the judicial phase, no equality of arms is afforded and therefore no 
fair trial is achieved. 
 
 
3. Trends in the Italian jurisprudence. 
 
But let's examine closer the prevailing positions within Italian administrative 
jurisprudence. 
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As anticipated Italian Courts are strongly convinced that the merits of an 
administrative discretionary choice is reserved to the public administration, unless differently 
provided for the legislator (in other terms, unless a case of jurisdiction on merits is 
established by law). 
By contrast, there is no similar level of clarity and consistency as to the treatment of 
technical discretion. 
Since 1999, Council of State has started to question the traditional idea of a full 
equivalence in their respective judicial treatments between administrative and technical 
discretion. In an important judgment
16
 related to the retirement treatment of a judge claiming  
the causal link between his illness (an heart attack) and his official duties (allegedly 
particularly stressing and demanding), the administrative judges abandoned the traditional 
doctrine of deference. In particular, they recalled that technical discretion and administrative 
discretion are two different concepts: the latter relates to assessment of public interest, the 
former does not. The Council of State observed that "the question of fact, related to a pre-
requisiste of lawfulness of the administrative act, does not  change - just because 
controversial - on a question of expediency, even where precedent or subsequent to a choice 
of expediency"
17
.  
The clear (and unexplained)  distance between this reasoning and that showed in the 
Placì case exempts us from mentioning other several cases that, similarly, reveal the high 
level of inconsistency within the administrative courts' jurisprudence. Just let's further note 
that in the Placì judgment, the Council of State observed that "the opinion above examined is 
free from contradictions, clear illogicity or failure from considering relevant facts, with the 
consequence that in present jurisdiction of lawfulness in which no review on merits as to the 
technical assessment of the medical commission is allowed, there is no room to uphold the 
challenges proposed by the appellant"
18
, while in the 1999 judgment, the same Court 
expressly rejected the idea that the controversiality of a certain administrative choice may, 
per se, justify a deferential approach. But, for examples, in the field of appeals against the 
results of bar examinations or in relation to certain profiles of the litigation on public tenders, 
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Administrative Courts are often totally unconditional in denying any real possibility of 
review of the technical discretionary choices, except in cases of "clear irrationality, absolute 
incongruence or macroscopic impropriety"
19
, i.e. in case of unreasonableness in the extreme, 
probably comparable to the British concept of Wednesbury unreasonableness. 
A final remark: in the latest years, the Court of Cassation (which, in its capacity of 
supreme court, is competent to ultimately decide whether a certain question belong to 
administrative merits or may be directly examined by the administrative Court) seems 
oriented to support a more deferential approach: for example in 2012
20
, it held that the 
assessment as to the professional reliability of a bidder in a public tenders represents a 
question of administrative merits, and, finally, in 2014, that the definition of the relevant 
market for the purpose of imposing an antitrust fine
21
 is as well a matter of administrative 
merits, notwithstanding they are both questions that, although controversial, do not entail 
evaluation of public interest. 
Judging from these latest trends in the Cassation'jurisprudence, it seems therefore that 
the approach by the Administrative Court is not at all likely due to become less deferential. 
 
4. Trends in the jurisprudence of the European Court of justice. 
Still in 2010, the Court of Justice of the European Union held that the General Court 
was prevented from expressing "its own differing assessment of the capability of the joint 
commitments to eliminate the competition problems identified by the Commission"; as, in 
doing so, the General Court "put forward its own assessment of complex economic 
circumstances and thus substituted its own assessment for that of the Commission, thereby 
encroaching on the discretion enjoyed by the Commission instead of reviewing the lawfulness 
of its assessment"
22
. In other terms, a rigid deferential approach was imposed on the grounds 
of the theorization of an authoritative power of "technical discretion" conferred to EU 
administrative bodies (such as the EU Commission). 
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After the Menarini case (that has recognized that administrative antitrust fines are of a 
criminal nature and therefore at least a full jurisdiction has to be afforded in the judicial phase 
of review of the sanction), the EU Court of Justice, as a way to reply to the ground of appeal 
according to which " the doctrine of ‘margin of appreciation’ and ‘judicial deference’ should 
now no longer be applied, since European Union law is now characterised by the huge fines 
imposed by the Commission, a development which is frequently described as the de facto 
‘criminalisation’ of European Union competition law", started to state that even in its review 
of legality, " the Courts cannot use the Commission’s margin of discretion – either as 
regards the choice of factors taken into account in the application of the criteria mentioned 
in the Guidelines or as regards the assessment of those factors – as a basis for dispensing 
with the conduct of an in-depth review of the law and of the facts"
23
. 
By now, this doctrine seems well established. In particularly, lately, in 2014, the 
Court re-affirmed that " It is also apparent from the case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights that the characteristics of a judicial body endowed with unlimited jurisdiction 
include the power to quash in all respects, on questions of fact and law, the decision at issue. 
Such a body must in particular have jurisdiction to examine all questions of fact and law 
relevant to the dispute before it" and, consistently, stated that " The EU judicature must, 
among other things, not only establish whether the evidence put forward is factually accurate, 
reliable and consistent, but must also determine whether that evidence contains all the 
relevant data that must be taken into consideration in appraising a complex situation and 
whether it is capable of substantiating the conclusions drawn from it". Therefore, a review on 
the existence of "manifest errors of assessment" does not suffice, but it is required "an in-
depth review, as regards questions of both fact and law, of the contested decision in the light 
of the pleas in law put forward by the appellants, thus satisfying the requirements of an 
unrestricted review for the purpose of Article 47 of the Charter "
24
 
More in general, the standard of full jurisdiction pursuant to art. 6 ECHR seems to 
increasingly being assigned the role of a general canon of minimal effectiveness of judicial 
remedies that needs to be guaranteed in EU, pursuant to art. 47 of the Charter of Nice. In fact, 
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the right to an effective remedy and, respectively  to a fair trial codified by arts. 47 of the 
Charter of Nice and 6 ECHR fully correspond and, therefore, pursuant to art. 52, par. 2, of the 
Charter. art. 47 is to be construed in the light of the Convention and the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence
25
. 
For example, in November 2013, the EU Court of Justice, in order to construe the 
right to have a case tried before a court having jurisdiction in particular in criminal matters as 
required by the Council Framework Decision 2005/214/JHA of 24 February 2005 on the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition to financial penalties as a precondition for 
the recognition, held that, after a pre-litigation administrative procedure, the administrative 
decision needs to challengeable in front of a court that has full jurisdiction to examine the 
case as regards both the legal assessment and the factual circumstances
26
. In other terms, at 
least in the field of administrative fines, the right to a judicial remedy means a right to a court 
of full jurisdiction, in the ECHR's meaning. 
But also as to administrative action involving the determination of civil rights, in 2013 
the EU Court of justice stated that art. 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union represents the canon of minimal effectiveness of judicial protection.
27
. 
In any case, ECHR is expected to become soon a formal part of the EU legal system, 
thanks to the accession of EU into ECHR, and, as a result, the ECHR obligations are due to 
assume, in any respect, the specific supremacy-primacy to be recognized to EU law
28
.   
In sum, a clear trend in favor of a less deferential approach in relation to technical 
discretion can be identified and this trend is explicitly driven by the necessity of reconciling 
the EU system of administrative enforcement of various regulations with the full jurisdiction 
doctrine developed by the European Court of Human Rights.  
Although it is still of essence to carefully considering whether and to what extent 
further to these (important) affirmation of principles, an actual change of the judicial practice 
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will really follow, these developments, according to influential commentators, are realizing 
«a significant and promising progress of the concerned EU Court jurisprudence»
29
. I 
 
Conclusions. 
In relation to technical discretion, Italian Administrative Courts seem to be moved by 
two opposite considerations, that, on a case by case basis and quite unpredictably, may 
prevail one over the other: 
a. on one side, they consider too demanding and time consuming a direct examination 
of the technical merits of the administrative decisions. They are much more used (and skilled) 
to analyzing pure legal issues, and the general reasonableness of the choice. They feel to not 
been prepared to directly address technical issues. To overcome this obstacle, Court could in 
theory appoint technical experts. But this power of appointment, formally introduced in 2000 
(Law no. 205 of 2000) and confirmed by art. 19 of the Administrative Trial Code, has been 
used only very few times, as felt incompatible with the very nature of the jurisdiction of 
lawfulness; 
b. on the other side, Administrative Courts want to be in a position to exercise a 
deeper scrutiny wherever, for a number of reasons, they consider appropriate a similar 
interventionism. In other terms, although in a minority of cases, Courts want to defend their 
institutional role. 
However, from a legal standpoint, it is increasingly clear, especially after the Placì 
case, that Courts cannot any longer affirm (either expressly or de facto) a sort of automatic 
equivalence between technical discretion and an area of (total or partial) immunity from 
judicial review. Technical discretion directly concerns central factual points of the 
controversy and, as such, needs to be fully reviewable.   
As well said by the EU Court of Justice, "margin of discretion" (especially if of 
technical nature) cannot any longer play the role of "basis for dispensing with the conduct of 
an in-depth review of the law and of the facts"
30
. 
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This approach by the EU judges suggests a critical reflection: in Italy we tend to 
address the issues of judicial review of technical discretion as a problem of conceptual 
distinction among administrative discretion and, respectively, technical one. Yet, it cannot be 
denied the existence and significant extension of a grey area in which choices of interests and 
technical complex assessments are so interconnected, to make very difficult the practical 
application of a distinction that is in abstract terms may seem persuasive. The way in which 
EU Court addresses the issue is probably more effective: any discretionary choice (regardless 
its distance from the classical model of administrative discretion) cannot represents a barrier 
to the full jurisdiction. In other terms, even accepting the idea that a technical decision may 
represent a power not substantially different from a decision of interest, the conclusion cannot 
change: in any case, the discretion (either technical or administrative) cannot limit the 
effectiveness of judicial review, i.e. the right to a full jurisdiction. 
Moreover, our Courts should metabolize the fact that the ECHR Court looks at the 
substance of the judicial case and, therefore, to the review really exercised, with the 
consequence that it is not any longer acceptable the strategy to pretend to carry out an 
effective review, without actually doing it. In fact, "Article 6 § 1 is intended to guarantee 
rights that are not theoretical or illusory, but practical and effective [....] "31.. 
We would like to conclude with a note of optimism. In January 2014, the  Court of 
Cassation showed a certain awareness on how ECHR requires essential innovation. Although 
in an obiter dictum, it observed that "also thanks to the European Community innovative 
suggestions, the boundaries between administrative discretion, not reviewable, and 
jurisdiction, are by now definitely open to an evolution in line with the two fundamental 
principles of full jurisdiction (arts. 6 ECHR and 47 of the Nice Charter) and of 
proportionality, intended to restrict the area of unreviewable administrative merits"
32
.   
In other terms, judging from this statement, the canon of full jurisdiction is starting to 
acquire, either directly or through art. 47 of the Nice Charter, the role of fundamental 
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principle of effectiveness of judicial protection vis-à-vis the administrative actions and, 
therefore, of general rule based on which the traditional issue of judicial review of technical 
discretion has to be addressed. 
 
 
